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COLEMAN v. THOMPSON-SACRIFICING
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN DEFERENCE TO
THE STATES: THE SUPREME COURT'S 1991
INTERPRETATION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
I. INTRODUCTION
Virginia coal miner Roger Keith Coleman was convicted
and sentenced to death by a Virginia trial court in 1982 for
the rape and murder of his sister-in-law.' He petitioned the
state court for a writ of habeas corpus, but the Buchanan
County Circuit Court ruled against him on numerous federal
constitutional issues and rejected his petition.2 His attorney
then filed a notice of appeal in response to the rejected peti-
tion, but missed the filing deadline by three days.3 Under
Virginia state law, missing the deadline for a notice of appeal
constitutes a procedural default to further appeals.4 The Vir-
ginia State Supreme Court ruled that Coleman's untimely
1. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2552 (1991); Jill Smolowe, Must
This Man Die?, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 40.
2. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2552. Coleman raised seven constitutional
claims in his state habeas petition based on the following allegations:
(1) at least one member of the jury failed to disclose his preconceived
opinion of Coleman's guilt; (2) Coleman was not afforded reasonably
effective assistance of counsel; (3) jurors were improperly excluded be-
cause of their opposition to imposition of the death penalty; (4) the
prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence; (5) the prosecu-
tion's closing argument denied Coleman a fair trial; (6) the jury in-
structions were constitutionally inadequate; and (7) Virginia's capital
murder statute and sentencing procedures were unconstitutional on
their face and as applied, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States.
Coleman v. Thompson, 895 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990).
3. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2553.
4. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:9(a) provides:
No appeal shall be allowed unless, within 30 days after the entry of
final judgment or other appealable order or decree, counsel for the ap-
pellant files with the clerk of the trial court a notice of appeal and at
the same time mails or delivers a copy of such notice to all opposing
counsel.
11 VA. CODE. ANN. § 5:9 (Michie 1993).
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appeal prevented him from entering any other appeals in the
state courts.5
Coleman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with
the federal court. The United States Supreme Court upheld
the lower federal courts and deferred to the state court deci-
sion in the interests of comity and federalism, because the
state decision was founded on adequate and independent
state grounds. 7 The Court relied on the procedural default
doctrine and held that Coleman had not exhausted his state
court remedies before he defaulted on his appeal;8 conse-
quently, federal review was not available. In short, when
Coleman's attorney filed the untimely notice of appeal in
state court, he forfeited Coleman's right to further state and
federal review of the case.
Coleman was executed on May 21, 1992.9 Controversy
surrounded the review process: Newly-discovered evidence
suggested that Coleman was not the murderer-or at least
had not acted alone' 0-and allegations of incompetent assist-
5. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2553.
6. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553 (1991). The federal dis-
trict court held that Coleman had procedurally defaulted pursuant to Virginia
Supreme Court Rule 5:9(a). Id. Nonetheless, the district court reviewed all
eleven claims (four federal constitutional claims raised in state habeas corpus
proceedings and seven raised in federal court) on the merits. Id. The court re-
jected all challenges without evidentiary hearings and denied the petition.
Coleman, 895 F.2d at 139. See supra note 2 for a comprehensive list of the
claims.
7. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-54. See also infra text accompanying notes
79-93.
8. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2553.
9. Robert L. Jackson & David G. Savage, Final Appeals Rejected. Killer is
Executed; Crime: Roger Coleman Dies by Electrocution in Virginia. He Had
Failed a Polygraph Test Earlier in the Day. High Court Turned Down His Bid
for a Stay, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at 16.
10. Virginia state law states that only the actual perpetrator of a crime may
be convicted of a capital murder unless the crime is murder for hire. VA. CODE.
ANN. § 18.2-18 (Michie 1993). The Virginia General Assembly added this
amendment, commonly called the "triggerman" statute, in 1977. Id. Prior to
this amendment, every principal in the second degree who was convicted of a
felony could be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished as if the individual were
a principal in the first degree. Now only the immediate perpetrator must be
found to be the principal in the first degree and thus liable for the capital mur-
der. The court, in Johnson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 255 S.E.2d 525, 527
(Va. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 920 (1981), quoted the state attorney general:
"It is the position of the Commonwealth that the defendant cannot be convicted
of capital murder by [evidence showing that the defendant merely planned] the
robbery and that a death ensued during the commission of the robbery, regard-
less of who committed the killing." Id.
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ance of counsel at trial and throughout the post-conviction
hearings haunted the proceedings." Many wondered
whether Coleman was guilty of the crime for which he was
executed. 2 But for the untimely notice of appeal and proce-
dural default, Coleman, and petitioners in similar circum-
stances, would have had access to federal habeas corpus re-
view with new evidence, and would have been able to utilize
the federal review process, as do petitioners who are able to
file their petitions on time.
A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus and
allow federal review of a claim if the petitioner alleges a vio-
lation of the United States Constitution. 13 The court may
conduct a new evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
state has constitutionally detained the petitioner.14 If the
state detention violates the Constitution, the federal court
may release the petitioner.' 5 The Virginia state rule, how-
11. See Smolowe, supra note 1, at 43-44.
12. See id. Roger L. Matney, a convicted felon, testified that while he was
incarcerated in the same cell block in the county jail with Coleman, petitioner
described the rape and killing of the victim Wanda McCoy. Coleman v. Vir-
ginia, 307 S.E.2d 864, 868 (Va. 1983). Matney testified that Coleman drew a
diagram of the McCoy house, that he admitted to being there on the night of the
killing, that a companion slashed the victim's throat with a knife, and that the
two men took the victim to the bedroom and took turns raping her. Id. Matney
remembered Coleman identifying his companion as "Danny Ray." Id. Coleman
began discussing a piece of paper towel, but the conversation between the in-
mates ended before Coleman finished discussing the paper towel. Id. The State
had evidence that a paper towel was found near the body. Id. at 868. A person
by the name of Danny Ray Stiltner was scheduled to testify for Virginia at the
Coleman trial, but was never called as a witness. Coleman v. Virginia, 307
S.E.2d 864, 868 (Va. 1983). The record reflects that Stiltner was also the
brother-in-law of McCoy. Id. at n.2.
The defense never presented evidence that may have raised reasonable
doubt regarding petitioner's guilt in the minds of the jurors. Id. A neighbor of
the victim reportedly found in the back of his truck a plastic bag, containing
blood-soaked lilac sheets, two Van Heusen cowboy shirts, and a pair of scissors.
Id. The neighbor buried the bag in a landfill instead of notifying the police. Id.
The court-appointed attorney who represented Coleman at the trial stated that
he knew about the evidence prior to the trial, but "considered the information
useless." Smolowe, supra note 1, at 43. Petitioner's pro bono attorney, who
handled the case during the final habeas petition, vigorously attempted to es-
tablish that petitioner was actually innocent of the crime. Id. The attorney dug
up the landfill where the neighbor allegedly buried the plastic bag and found a
one-foot by two-foot swatch of the sheet. Id. at 44.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1988).
14. Id. § 2244(b).
15. Id. § 2241(c)(3) (1988). Section 2243 in pertinent part reads: "The court
shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law
and justice require." Id. See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 465 (1953).
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ever, barred further federal or state review of the case; thus,
the courts never reviewed the new evidence to determine
whether it had an exculpatory effect upon Coleman's convic-
tion. If this evidence were evaluated pursuant to a writ of
habeas corpus and were found to exculpate Coleman to some
degree, then the federal court could have provided a remedy.
This comment examines the history and purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus to determine whether the writ should
have been utilized in Coleman's particular circumstances. 6
The focus then turns to the procedural default doctrine; its
application in Coleman quashed any further appeals once the
filing deadline in the state appellate court passed. 17 The
United States Supreme Court relied upon the doctrine of fed-
eralism throughout its discussions of both the writ and the
procedural default doctrine to justify deferring to Virginia
state court decisions and barring federal action.' 8 The sali-
ent issue is whether the goals of federalism and the writ of
habeas corpus were achieved by applying the doctrine in
Coleman.
The United States Supreme Court closed the case of
Roger Keith Coleman when it refused to grant the writ of
habeas corpus.19 Foreclosing further judicial review and pos-
sible relief to a death-penalty petitioner in a situation such as
Coleman's subordinates the individual's fundamental rights
and contradicts the fundamental principles of the writ of
habeas corpus.2 °
This comment proposes that the Supreme Court dispose
of the procedural default doctrine in the narrow category of
cases in which new evidence sufficient to cast reasonable
doubt upon the validity of a defendant's conviction has been
discovered.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus occupies a unique position in
Anglo-American legal history. The Great Writ of Liberty, as
16. See infra text accompanying notes 21-125.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 13029-187.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 115-125, 128-196.
19. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8, and infra text accompanying
notes 94-96.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 28-37.
628 [Vol. 34
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it is often called, is heralded as man's last recourse against
illegal confinement.2 ' In England, habeas corpus was the
most important writ in constitutional law because it was a
"swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint
or confinement."22 In 1962, the United States Supreme Court
adopted this perspective in Fay v. Noia:
23
[I]ts function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious
remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable re-
straints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society,
government must always be accountable to the judiciary
for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be
shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of
law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release.
Thus there is nothing novel in the fact that today habeas
corpus in the federal courts provides a mode for the re-
dress of denials of due process of law. Vindication of due
process is precisely its historic office.24
The United States Congress and Supreme Court main-
tained this principle by safeguarding the existence and appli-
cation of the federal writ. Congress provided in Article I, Sec-
tion Nine of the Constitution that the writ would apply in a
plethora of circumstances, as "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it."
25
The Court, in Bowen v. Johnston,26 declared there was no
higher duty than maintaining the writ unimpaired and un-
suspended, except under the few circumstances specified in
the Constitution.2 v
Particular phrases consistently emerge from the Court's
discussions of the writ that reflect the fundamental purpose
of the doctrine. "Fundamental fairness" and the avoidance of
"manifest injustice" outline the writ's operative effect.28 The
21. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 28.2, at 1178 (2d ed. 1992).
22. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1962), overruled by Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
23. Id. at 391.
24. Id. at 401-02.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
26. 306 U.S. 19 (1939).
27. Id. at 26-27.
28. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 515 (1986) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (noting that the Court historically preserved writ as relief against in-
justice); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (reiterating that
62919941
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Court described the writ as cutting through the maze of legal
procedure to find the heart of justice in those situations when
the law somehow fails and grave injustice results.29 In order
to accomplish this function, however, the writ must often be
applied in circumstances that seemingly contradict the estab-
lished legal precedent of criminal procedure. A dissenting
Justice William Brennan wrote, in Murray v. Carrier,3 ° that
"the scope of the writ has been adjusted to meet changed con-
ceptions of the kind of criminal proceedings so fundamentally
defective as to make imprisonment under them
unacceptable."3 1
The Supreme Court slowly redefined the profile of fed-
eral and state criminal procedure with increasingly expan-
sive applications of the writ. In expanding beyond the origi-
nal, limited construction in Ex parte Bollman,32 the Court
justified its actions by finding that many circumstances war-
ranted the exceptional relief afforded by the writ. When fur-
thering the principles of the writ, the Court acknowledged
that it was not directly interfering with state procedure by
revising the state court judgment, but rather utilizing the
power granted to it by acting upon the body of the
33petitioner.3
Justices and commentators have often expounded upon
the unstructured application of the writ, asserting that in or-
der to accomplish its historic purpose, application should not
the Court's central concern is fundamental fairness); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 126 (1982) (characterizing writ as holding an indisputably honored posi-
tion in American jurisprudence as a bulwark aginst fundamentally unjust
convictions).
29. See, e.g., Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969) (expounding upon
flexibility of writ to defeat procedural error and resulting injustice); Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (recognizing writ as protection against
wrongful restraint); Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 346-47 (1915) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (noting writ's purpose as collateral attack on procedure).
30. 477 U.S. 478 (1968).
31. Id. See also, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Cole-
man v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (permitting habeas review in absence
of appellate review where appellate review could have resulted in retrial and
imposition of death penalty); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (recogniz-
ing appropriateness of writ for conviction based upon allegedly coerced confes-
sion by federal law enforcement officers); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)
(applying writ to conviction achieved in violation of Sixth Amendment); Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (issuing writ where trial proceedings, counsel,
judge, and jury influenced by public insurrection).
32. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
33. Fay, 372 U.S. at 431.
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be restricted to the narrow interpretations of medieval proce-
dure.34 Instead, procedural instruments should achieve a ra-
tional legal end under contemporary circumstances, rather
than become arcane rigidities that outlive their usefulness.
35
The Court has recognized that the writ is not a static, nar-
row, formalistic remedy, 6 but rather must be "administered
with the initiative and flexibility" essential to finding and
correcting miscarriages of justice.37
1. English Origins
The writ of habeas corpus 38 was developed in England
several centuries ago,3 9 and the British common law defines
the scope of its application. In Darnel's Case,4 ° petitioners
attempted to utilize the writ to enforce the guarantees of the
Magna Carta against imprisonment by the Crown without ju-
dicial authorization. 41  The English court, however, ruled
that it must abide by the Crown's decisions and therefore de-
nied the petition.42  Dissatisfaction with this judgment
prompted Parliament to enact the 1641 Act, which removed
power from the Crown to make arrests without probable
cause.43 This Act granted any arrested person immediate ac-
tion by writ of habeas corpus to a judicial determination of
34. See Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional
Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REV. 335, 361 (1952). See also Hensley v.
Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345-51 (1973) (per curiam) (noting Court's consistent
rejection of formalistic constraints on applicability of writ); Jones v. Cunning-
ham, 371 U.S. 236, 239-40 (1963) (per curiam) (preserving opportunity for fur-
ther grounds for writ application); William J. Brennan Jr., Federal Habeas
Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423,
425 (1961).
35. See Collings, supra note 34, at 361.
36. See, e.g., Hensley, 411 U.S. at 349-50; Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286,
291 (1969) (expounding upon flexibility of writ to cut through procedure and
form in order to release petitioners from intolerable restraint); Jones, 371 U.S.
at 243.
37. Harris, 394 U.S. at 291.
38. The meaning of the writ is derived from the Latin term "habeus corpus,"
which translates as "have the body." LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 21, at 1178.
The common law definition is a judicial order directing a person to have the
body brought before a tribunal at a certain time and place, in order to facilitate
the proceedings. Id. In the mid-fourteenth century, it became an independent
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the detention's legality. 44 Twenty-nine years later, the writ
was issued in Bushell's Case45 to release a juror held in con-
tempt for refusing to return a guilty verdict as directed by the
trial court.46
2. The American Writ of Habeas Corpus
a. Incorporation into the United States
Constitution
The United States adopted the English concept of the
writ of habeas corpus by incorporation into the United States
Constitution.4 7 The language in the Constitution appeared to
grant nearly unlimited access to the writ. The Framers wrote
that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it." 48
The Judiciary Acts of 178949 and 1867,50 however, re-
stricted the availability of the writ of habeas corpus, because
each Act expressly authorized issuance of the writ by a par-
ticular judicial body.5 In the Act of 1789, the first Congress
specifically authorized the issuance of the writ by the newly
created federal courts.2 This action suggests implicitly that
Congress did not believe that the lower federal courts inher-
ently had the power to issue the writ. The Act added the fol-
lowing language to the law governing the writ: "[The writ]
shall in no case extend to prisoners in [jail], unless where
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1178-79.
46. Id. Justice Brennan concluded, in Fay v. Noia, 373 U.S. 381 (1962),
overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 11 S. Ct. 2546 (1991), that Bushell's Case
established that the writ was available at common law to challenge imprison-
ment based upon a conviction in violation of due process. Id. Justice Powell
countered, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Powell, J., con-
curring and dissenting in part), arguing that Justice Brennan had interpreted
Bushell's Case too broadly. Id. Justice Powell asserted that the writ was devel-
oped only to allow the petitioner to challenge the jurisdiction of the convicting
court. Id. at 233-36.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
48. Id.
49. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
50. Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385-86 reprinted in Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441-42 (1962).
51. See Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 49, and Judiciary Act of 1867,
supra note 50.




they are in custody under or by colour of the authority of the
United States or are committed for trial before some court of
the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to tes-
tifr."53 This declaration is well recognized as granting to fed-
eral prisoners the power to utilize the writ.54 The Act of
1789, however, did not address the issue of whether the writ
could be granted to prisoners in custody under state convic-
tions who were seeking relief from federal court regarding is-
sues protected by federal law.
b. Common Law Development
While the importance of the writ is demonstrated by its
presence in the Constitution, the practical impact on individ-
ual rights has been shaped by case law. In Ex parte Boll-
man,5 5 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that courts may
rely upon common law to determine where the writ appropri-
ately applies.5 6 The Court also held that congressional re-
fusal to authorize federal habeas corpus relief for federal pris-
oners was inconsistent with the Framers' intent, 7 although
the denial of such relief to state prisoners was consistent with
any "obligation" the Constitution's clause imposed upon Con-
gress.5 8 The Bollman Court, however, failed to define the cir-
cumstances under which the writ would be available to state
as well as federal prisoners. Instead, it reasoned that the
writ could not readily be extended to persons in custody of
state courts.5 9 Nonetheless, the Court managed to find a con-
stitutionally protected right to the writ.60 Thirty-eight years
later, in 1845, the Court specifically found in Ex parte Dorr6 1
that the Judiciary Act barred issuance of the federal writ to
state prisoners.62
53. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 21.
54. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 74, 78 (1977).
55. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
56. Id. at 93-94. Justice Marshall reasoned that the Court must be able to
call people before it in order to accomplish its judicial tasks. Id. at 79. There-
fore, the Court could define when the writ would be utilized; for example, com-
pelling attendance by a witness or a potential juror, or holding a person in con-
tempt of court. Id.
57. Id. at 95.
58. Id. at 97.
59. Id.
60. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4. Cranch) 74, 75 (1807).
61. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
62. Id.
1994]
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While the Court grappled with the application of the
writ, Congress intermittently provided legislative guidance
and expanded the scope of the habeas corpus writ. The Judi-
ciary Act of 1867 generally extended the writ to state prison-
ers.63 The Act stated that the several courts of the United
States shall have the power to grant habeas relief to any per-
son restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution or
of any treaty or law of the United States within the court's
jurisdiction.6 4
c. Determining the Writ's Scope of Applicability
The only real guidance Congress has provided regarding
the practical methods of application of the writ is designating
which courts may issue the writ. The Supreme Court devel-
oped the application of the writ, and Congress subsequently
codified many of the common law decisions in 1948.65
Today, the Supreme Court must evaluate no fewer than
four issues to determine whether the federal courts have ju-
risdiction to hear a habeas claim:6 6 (1) whether it is a claim
the federal courts may properly adjudicate;67 (2) whether ade-
quate and independent state grounds bar consideration of
otherwise cognizable federal issues; (3) the extent to which
63. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78 (1977).
64. Judiciary Act of 1867, supra note 50. The Act of 1867 included a major
change that provided that petitioners could "deny any of the material facts set
forth in the return" or allege any additional fact. Id. Consequently, the federal
court has not limited its jurisdiction from the habeas writ to appellate review of
the state court, but has additionally allowed factual inquiry. See Brown v. Al-
len, 344 U.S. 443, 464 (1953).
65. Sections §§ 2241-55 of 28 U.S.C. resemble their predecessors by virtue
of the language regarding the issuance of the federal writ to prisoners held in
contravention of the Constitution, the nation's laws, or the nation's treaties. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988). It also includes restrictions regarding exhaustion of
available state remedies as a prerequisite to gaining access to the federal writ.
Id. § 2241(c)(3).
66. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 78-79. The Court commented that the case
law on the first three issues demonstrated that historically the Court has been
willing to overturn or modify its earlier rules regarding the scope of the writ,
although the language authorizing the Court's jurisdiction has not changed.
Id. at 81.
67. Section § 2241(a) of 28 U.S.C. states in pertinent part: "Writs of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district
courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions ....
Section § 2241(c)(3) states in pertinent part: "The writ of habeas corpus
shall not extend to a prisoner unless .... [hie is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States .... " 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a),(c)(3) (1988).
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the petitioner must exhaust the state remedies before resort-
ing to federal relief;8 and (4) whether the federal court must
defer to the prior resolution of a claim in state proceedings.6 9
The scope of these inquiries overlaps, and the Court has inte-
grated each into the analysis necessary to determine whether
a federal habeas claim will be heard.
1. The Type of Habeas Corpus Claims the Federal
Court May Hear
The writ was first utilized by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of the statutes under which they were con-
victed.70 Under the modern codification, if the petitioner is
"in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States," the federal court may issue the writ of
habeas corpus. 71 This broadly worded phrase provides the
basis for determining what type of claims the federal court
may hear.
Subsequent to its original construction, the use of the
writ was expanded to include claims addressing the scope of a
court's authority at trial.72 In the early twentieth century,
the Court began hearing claims resulting from jury and court
trials tainted by "mob domination."73 The Court, in Johnson
v. Zerbst,74 granted writs to review claims addressing the
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988). This section provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in cus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies avail-
able in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of
available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
Id.
Section § 2254(c) reads: "An applicant shall not be deemed to have ex-
hausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of
this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any avail-
able procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1988).
69. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1977).
70. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2541(c)(3). The writ is not authorized for state prisoners at
the discretion of the federal courts; the availability is expressly restricted to
state prisoners held in violation of the Constitution. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 486 (1953).
72. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
73. Id. See also Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (refusing to issue
writ pursuant to allegations that trial process was tainted by mob protests).
74. 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (regarding an indigent federal prisoner claiming
that he was denied the right to counsel at trial).
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"power and authority" of the trial court.7 5 The Court later
abandoned jurisdictional issues as the determinative criteria,
focusing instead upon the accused's constitutional rights in
situations where the writ was the only effective means of pre-
serving these rights.7 6 In 1953, the Court, in Brown v. Al-
len,77 resolved an age-old question when it held that a federal
habeas court could always review a state court's decision
when a federal issue was dispositive to the case.78
3. Adequate and Independent State Grounds Barring
Federal Habeas Review
The Supreme Court has long ruled that when a decision
in a case is based upon state law grounds that are adequate
and independent, the federal court will not review the case
even if independent federal claims exist.79 If the federal
court addresses a federal issue that is not dispositive to the
case, then it would merely be providing an advisory opinion."
As federal courts are barred from issuing advisory opinions,
the federal court would not have grounds to review a case
based on adequate and independent state grounds.8 ' The
Supreme Court has applied this principle to cases where the
Supreme Court sits as an appellate court reviewing state
court judgments, as well as to situations where a petitioner
seeks relief from a federal habeas court for a state court
conviction. 2
In sum, a federal habeas court may obtain jurisdiction if
the federal issue of constitutional error is dispositive in the
75. Id.
76. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
77. Id.
78. Id. A federal court hearing a claim pursuant to the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus is commonly referred to as a federal habeas court. Id.
79. The Court has applied this analysis to state laws that are procedural as
well as substantive. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)
(denying writ because state grounds are adequate and independent and there-
fore justify the state court decision); Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935)
(denying writ because federal issues not raised on appeal when opportunity ex-
isted). The central issue of the analysis is jurisdictional; if there are sufficient
grounds to support a state decision, the Supreme Court has no power to review
such a decision. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
80. See Herb, 324 U.S. at 125-26.
81. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991).
82. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977); Harris v. Reed,
489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989).
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case.8 3 A petitioner convicted under adequate and constitu-
tional state law may be released upon a favorable federal rul-
ing on a dispositive federal issue, regardless of the validity of
his or her conviction on state grounds.8 4
This overlap between federal and state jurisdiction
threatens the sovereignty of states to develop and execute
their own laws in response to the crimes within their borders.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Daniels v. Allen8 5 declared that
allowing federal habeas corpus review in such circumstances
would "subvert the entire system of state criminal justice and
destroy state energy in the detection and punishment of
crime. "86
Commenting on the issue of federalism, Professor Paul
Bator noted that Moore v. Dempsey,8 7 one of the two promi-
nent habeas corpus cases involving "mob domination,"88 could
represent the following proposition:
[A] conclusory and out-of-hand rejection by a state of a
claim of violation of federal right, without any process of
inquiry being afforded at all, cannot insulate the merits of
the question from a habeas corpus court: if the state's
findings are to 'count,' they must be reasoned findings ra-
tionally reached through fair procedures.8 9
Professor Bator also noted that it was logically possible
to have a system whereby the state's failure to provide suffi-
cient corrective process could itself constitute "error" subject
to reversal on direct review by the Supreme Court.90 The
Due Process Clause could be interpreted as imposing an af-
firmative duty upon states "to provide a full system of reme-
dies for the meaningful litigation of all federal questions rele-
vant to the case."91
83. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
84. See id.
85. 345 U.S. 946 (1953), decided sub nom. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953).
86. Id. at 485.
87. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
88. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), and Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1922), are two cases in which the petitioners filed requests for writs of
habeas corpus alleging that the trial proceedings were dominated by mobs,
which in turn destroyed the possibility of impartial adjudication.
89. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REV. 441, 489 (1963).
90. Id. at 491.
91. Id.
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Bator suggests that using the habeas writ as a "back-
stop" for the inadequacies of state procedure is politically un-
wise. 92 The preferred method of handling the state's inade-
quacies is to declare the procedure "error" on direct review by
the Supreme Court, thereby forcing the states to create ade-
quate procedural systems.93
3. Exhaustion of Available State Remedies Required
The modern statute governing the habeas corpus petition
requires a petitioner to attempt to obtain relief from the state
court at all appellate levels, including the state supreme
court and the state habeas court,9 4 prior to petitioning the
federal courts for habeas review.95 Failure to use a state
remedy bars federal habeas corpus review except where the
circumstances giving rise to the complaint involve lack of
counsel, incapacity, or interference by officials. 96
One reason for this requirement is that state courts are
given the opportunity to cure their own constitutional errors
before allowing a federal court to adjudicate the issue.9 7 The
other reason is that requiring exhaustion of state remedies
promotes orderly and proper utilization of the existing state
procedure.98 States have criminal procedures that regulate
the lengthy appellate process and provide petitioners with
92. Id. at 492.
93. Id. at 492-93.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). The state courts may issue writs of habeas
corpus pursuant to state law. Id. If a petitioner is held in state custody, comity
dictates that the petitioner plead his claims to the state trial, appellate, and
habeas courts before petitioning the federal courts for relief on the federal is-
sues. Id.
95. Id. This section provides that "[an applicant shall not be deemed to
have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the
meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise,
by any available procedure, the question presented." Id.
96. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433, 486-87 (1953).
97. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), overruled by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
435 (1963). The Court reiterated in Coleman that the exhaustion doctrine was
based upon considerations of comity between the courts. Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991) (citing Darr, 339 U.S. at 204). The Darr Court
noted that "a doctrine which teaches that one court should defer action on
causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty
with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an
opportunity to pass upon the matter." Darr, 339 U.S at 204. The Darr Court
required the petitioner to seek certiorari in the Supreme Court as a precondi-
tion for habeas corpus review. Id.
98. Brennan, supra note 34, at 429. Justice Brennan reasoned that the
Court traditionally declined to exercise its power to review cases until after the
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avenues of relief.9 9 Granting federal courts jurisdiction over
federal constitutional claims arising from state court proceed-
ings before full use of the state court system usurps state sov-
ereignty over its own law and government' 00 and defeats the
goal of judicial economy.
The Court yielded to this principle in Ex parte Royall,' 0
by delaying federal habeas jurisdiction over a Virginia peti-
tioner's claims until he exhausted all available remedies in
state court. 102 The Court held that even where a federal
court has the power to release the state prisoner, it should
not intervene until after state proceedings conclude.1
0 3
Eighty-two years later in Brown v. Allen, 10 4 the Court re-
stricted the availability of the writ by defining "exhaust[ion
of] available state remedies" as utilizing all available state
remedies, unless prohibited by interference from officials, in-
capacity, or lack of counsel. 10 5 The Court held that demon-
strating that the time for filing an appeal expired was insuffi-
cient justification for a federal court to issue the writ.10 6
Failure to exhaust all remedies barred federal habeas corpus
review. 107
In Fay v. Noia,'0 8 the Court determined this re
straint was based upon consideration of comity rather than
state courts make final determinations in a demand for orderly procedure. Id.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
99. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). See also Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973) (quoting Note, Develop-
ment in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1038, 1094 (1970)).
100. The Coleman Court recognized the importance of comity between the
state and federal government, and assumed that this concept would be achieved
if the Court were allowed to review the state ruling on direct review, before
allowing the petitioner to seek habeas relief. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2559.
101. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 250-51.
104. 334 U.S. 443 (1968).
105. Id. at 487.
106. Id. The Brown Court noted that the term "exhaust[ion of] available
state remedies" had been interpreted with varying results in the federal circuit
courts. Id. at 487. See also, e.g., Ekberg v. McGee, 191 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1951)
(refusing to consider that the statute intended to deny a federal forum where
state procedures were inexhaustible); Master v. Baldi, 198 F.2d 113, 116 (3rd
Cir. 1952) (holding that it is sufficient to exhaust only one of several available
alternative state remedies).
107. Brown, 344 U.S. at 448.
108. 372 U.S. 391,418 (1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct.
2546 (1991). The Court followed Fay in Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101
(1988), where it pronounced:
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power. 109 The Fay Court held that the exhaustion require-
ment bars petitioners who have not yet availed themselves of
possible state court remedies, 110 as well as to those who have
deliberately refused to seek state adjudication of federal is-
sues."' Furthermore in Stone v. Powell, 2 the Court denied
federal habeas review where the petitioner had full and fair
opportunity to raise the claim in a state proceeding."13
4. Federal Deference to State Proceedings
State legislatures and judiciaries create a body of sub-
stantive and procedural law designed to meet state individ-
ual needs, and maintain sovereign power over the laws' exe-
cution." 4 The Court in Reed v. Ross" 5 acknowledged that
"[e]ach State's complement of procedural rules facilitates this
complex process, channeling, to the extent possible, the reso-
lution of various types of questions to the stage of the judicial
process at which they can be resolved most fairly and effi-
[T]he Courts... of the United States, while they have power to grant
writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of
restraint of liberty of any person in custody under the authority of a
State in violation of the Constitution .... yet, except in cases of pecu-
liar urgency, ought not to exercise that jurisdiction by a discharge of
the person in advance of a final determination of his case in the courts
of the State ....
Id. at 104-05.
The Court later held that any decision by the state supreme court adverse
to the state prisoner's federal claim does not preclude federal habeas court adju-
dication of the matter; the state court decision would not be considered res judi-
cata. Daniels v. Allen, 345 U.S. 946 (1953), decided sub noma. Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953). See also Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214-15 (1950),
overruled by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (holding res judicata does not
apply to fedearal habeas proceedings, thereby allowing federal courts to con-
sider federal issues on habeas petition).
109. Fay, 372 U.S. at 418.
110. Id. at 415-20.
111. Id. at 438-39.
112. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
113. Id. at 494.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. 227 (1859)
(determining that state police power which is not surrendered to general gov-
ernment is reserved to the state government); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943) (finding state governments are sovereign within their territories, except
as provided by specific constitutional prohibitions and conflicts with powers del-
egated to the national government).
115. 468 U.S. 1 (1984).
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ciently."116 The procedure provides an orderly structure for
appellate and state collateral challenges, and affords the
state the opportunity to resolve issues soon after trial, while
evidence is still available for evaluation or, if necessary, to
retry the case if the petitioner succeeds in his challenges." 7
The Reed Court asserted that the procedural rules promote
"not only the accuracy and efficiency of judicial decisions, but
also the finality of those decisions, by forcing the defendant to
litigate all of his claims together" as soon after trial as the
docket allows."'
Some fear that an attorney may deliberately "sandbag"
his or her defenses if the federal habeas writ were available
whether or not all federal claims were brought in state
court. 1 9 If a federal habeas court has the power to overturn
any state conviction on federal grounds, regardless of
whether all state remedies are pursued, then many attorneys
may present their clients' defense in this bifurcated manner
to increase the opportunities for review and unnecessarily
prolong litigation. Constitutional claims that may be adjudi-
cated at trial could possibly bombard the federal docket.
Without the mandatory state procedural exhaustion require-
ment, there would be no assurance that state disposition con-
cludes judicial adjudication. 120 The state courts might stand
merely as a preliminary judicial body as the federal claim
would be finally adjudicated and laid to rest by the federal
habeas court.
In Darr v. Burford,12 1 the Supreme Court recognized
that the federal courts have the power to re-examine consti-
tutional issues arising in state court trials on a writ only after
state appellate review and denial of certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court. 122 In Brown v. Allen, 123 the Court ex-
116. Id. at 10. The Court highlighted the functional purposes of state proce-
dure by pointing out that the court handled the guilt determinination as well as
the constitutional challenges to the pre-trial and trial procedure. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 10-11.
119. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1976). "Sandbagging" occurs
when a defendant or the defendant's attorney takes his or her chances in the
state trial to obtain an acquittal, but saves some defenses to present to the fed-
eral habeas court if the defendant is convicted. See id.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 138-40.
121. 339 U.S. 200 (1950), overruled by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
122. Id. at 214.
123. 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).
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plained that the state court's determination of the federal is-
sues will be accorded the "weight that federal practice gives
to the conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdic-
tion on federal constitutional issues. It is not resjudicata."24
Congress later amended Section 2254 to hold that there were
circumstances when the state court's factual findings are
"presumed to be correct."125 In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 26
the Court held that a federal court may grant a habeas re-
quest for failure to develop a material fact in a state court
proceeding. 127
B. Procedural Bar Doctrine
In Coleman v. Thompson, 28 Virginia Supreme Court
Rule 5:9(a) barred further review because the attorney failed
to follow correct procedure. 29 The Supreme Court recog-
nized this rule as adequate and independent state grounds on
which to determine Coleman's fate.' 3 0 The principle that
governs this procedure is called the "procedural default doc-
trine."131 Under this rule, failure to follow a procedural re-
quirement results in the "default" of one's right to further re-
view. 132 In Coleman, this resulted in the conclusion of state
review, thereby barring any federal habeas corpus.' 33
The procedural bar doctrine relies upon the exhaustion
requirement and dictates that a habeas petitioner must sat-
isfy state procedural requirements before he may have access
to federal relief.134 The rationale is that the procedural bar
promotes comity by providing states the first opportunity to
correct any constitutional violation in their own proceedings,
prior to federal adjudication of the matter.135 The procedural
bar sanctions improper procedural conduct and motivates a
124. Id. at 457-58 (footnote omitted).
125. See, La Vallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S 690 (1973) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(1988).
126. 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992).
127. Id. at 1719.
128. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
129. See also supra note 4.
130. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
131. See Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2553.
132. Id.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8, 94-96.





petitioner to follow state procedural requirements.' 3 6 The pe-
titioner must follow state rules or else risk forfeiting the right
to further review.
The procedural bar demonstrates that a petitioner may
forfeit his constitutional rights in criminal and civil cases by
failing to make a timely assertion of his rights in the proper
court. Justice O'Connor reasoned in Coleman that there was
no principle more familiar to the Supreme Court than this
forfeiture of constitutional claims. 137 She explained that time
limits for procedural filings were "jurisdictional,"3 ' and ef-
fectively establish a definite point in time where the opportu-
nity to litigate will end. The rule also indicates to potential
appellees that if the filings are not made by the specific point
in time, the appellees will be free from the appellant's
claims. 1 9
1. Expansive Application
In 1913, the Court first enunciated the procedural bar in
Ex parte Spencer.140 The Court denied a state prisoner fed-
eral habeas review after he exhausted his state remedies, be-
cause he deliberately withheld presenting his federal claims
in state court in hopes of gaining federal review. 14 1 Forty
years later, the Court expanded the application of the writ;
once available only to federal petitioners, it was extended to
petitioners challenging state convictions on federal claims.
142
In Brown v. Allen,143 a state death row petitioner asserted
that racial discrimination had influenced the jury that con-
victed him, and that a coerced confession had been admitted
136. See infra text accompanying notes 119-21, 138-40.
137. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991) (citing Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944)).
138. Id. The Court relied upon Browder v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 434
U.S. 257 (1978) and found that a state prisoner was barred from federal habeas
review because his untimely appeal was prohibited under Federal Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 4(a). The Court in Coleman has described the rule as
"mandatory and jurisdictional." Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2565.
139. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2565. (citing Matton Steamboat Co. v. Murphy,
319 U.S. 412, 415 (1943)). See also Browder v. Director, Ill. Dept. of Correc-
tions, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (compelling respondent to release petitioner
from custody because respondent failed to meet deadline for appeal).
140. 228 U.S. 652 (1913).
141. Id.
142. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
143. Id.
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into evidence. 1 44 The state appellate court determined that
the claims lacked merit, but the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari. 145 The Court held that the state court's determina-
tion of the matter was not res judicata, and therefore the fed-
eral courts were free to adjudicate the matter. 146 The Court
ruled that a state prisoner's challenge to the trial court's reso-
lution of dispositive federal issues is always reviewable by
the federal habeas court.147
In Daniels v. Allen, 148 the companion case to Brown, the
Court ruled that federal claims never considered on the mer-
its in state court could not be reviewed on direct appeal to the
federal court. 1 49 Daniels' claims were never heard in state
court, because his attorney did not file his appeal in a timely
manner. 150  Late filings constitute a default under North
Carolina state law, unless the petitioner proves the filings
were detained without opportunity for appeal. 15 ' The Court
concluded that the procedural default foreclosed the possibil-
ity of federal habeas review. 152 The Court failed to proffer a
definitive analysis for this ruling, suggesting instead that
there were three possible bases for the decision: the exhaus-
tion doctrine required foreclosure of a claim that cannot be
exhausted in state court because of a procedural irregularity;
the failure to perfect the appeal constituted a "waiver" of the
claim; and the procedural requirement provided adequate
and independent state grounds for the decision. 153
2. The Deliberate By-Pass Standard
In Fay v. Noia, 154 the Court determined that application
of the procedural bar doctrine depended upon whether the
144. Id. at 466.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 458 (footnote omitted).
147. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).
148. 345 U.S. 946 (1953), decided sub nom. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953).
149. Brown, 344 U.S. at 466-67.
150. Id. at 482-83.
151. Id. at 485.
152. Id. at 460.
153. See Daniels v. Allen, 345 U.S. 946 (1953), decided sub nom. Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 460 (1953).
154. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546
(1991). Respondent Noia sought habeas relief, alleging that his state court con-
viction was based upon a coerced confession in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 395-98. Noia's co-defendants had made timely appeals for
644 [Vol. 34
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procedural default was a deliberate action or an inadvertent
error."' 5 The Court conferred federal court jurisdiction over
any allegation of unconstitutional restraint, regardless of
whether the restraint was otherwise based on adequate and
independent state grounds.1 5 6 It held that allowing state pro-
cedural rules to defeat federal constitutional concerns "wholly
misconceives" the scope of due process.1 5 7 The Court asserted
that forfeiting remedies available in state court does not le-
gitimize the unconstitutional conduct utilized in securing the
conviction.15 8 The Court identified the problematic analysis
of Murdock v. Memphis'5 9 as a failure to recognize that deci-
sions based upon adequate and independent state grounds
limit appellate review rather than federal habeas review.
160
Justice William Brennan, writing for the majority, stated
that this doctrine would not be extended to limit the federal
court's power under the federal habeas statute.
16 1
The Fay Court held that a federal habeas judge has lim-
ited discretion to deny relief to a petitioner who has "deliber-
ately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts" and
thereby forfeited the right to further appeals. 162 This stan-
their convictions, which were subsequently reversed. Id. Noia, however, filed
his untimely appeal after the reversals were granted. Id. The New York courts
ruled that his coram nobis action was barred as a result of this procedural fail-
ure. Id. The Fay Court overruled Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) and
granted Noia the right to make the untimely claim. Fay, 372 U.S. at 438.
155. Fay, 372 U.S. at 438.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 428.
159. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
160. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429 (1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). The Fay Court identified the court's flawed decision
in Murdock, 87 U.S. at 590, which held that the Court's lack of jurisdiction on
direct review to decide questions of state law also precludes federal review of
federal questions. Fay, 372 U.S. at 429 (citing Murdock, 87 U.S. at 590). The
Fay Court acknowledged that exhaustion of state remedies is a prerequisite for
a petitioner to qualify for federal habeas petition as evidenced in this require-
ment's codification in 28 U.S. § 2255; a state court judgment, however, is not a
prerequisite in order for the federal court to gain jurisdiction. Fay, 372 U.S. at
429. The Court held that when a state's decision unconstitutionally denies a
defendant the right to liberty, the federal court cannot revise the state court
decision on habeas review. It can, however, release the prisoner because of its
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. Id. at 430-31.
161. Fay, 372 U.S. at 430-31. "The doctrine under which state procedural
defaults are held to constitute an adequate and independent state law ground
barring direct Supreme Court review is not to be extended to limit the power
granted the federal courts under the federal habeas statute." Id. at 399.
162. Id. at 438.
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dard endowed the federal judges with the responsibility of de-
termining whether the petitioner failed to meet his proce-
dural requirements inadvertently or as a litigation strategy.
The deliberate by-pass standard assumes that "[a] man
under conviction for a crime has an obvious inducement to do
his very best to keep his state remedies open, and not stake
his all on the outcome of a federal habeas proceeding which,
in many respects, may be less advantageous to him than a
state court proceeding." 163 Inadvertent failure by an attorney
or petitioner to comply with procedural requirements under
Fay would not deny the petitioner further possibilities for re-
lief.1 64 The Fay standard allows judges to bar further appeals
if they find that the default was a deliberate attempt to cir-
cumvent state law. The Court reasoned that a deliberate by-
pass by the petitioner was probably an attempt to escape
state adjudication because his chances for relief were greater
when based solely on federal claims. 165 The Court refused to
allow behavior that deliberately flouted state law and
procedure. 166
3. Development of the Cause-and-Prejudice Standard
The Court never revisited the standard established in
Fay. All subsequent cases limited a petitioner's abilities to
receive a habeas petition in federal court. 167 Eleven years af-
ter Fay, the Court in Davis v. United States168 found that a
habeas petitioner must show sufficient "cause" for his default
163. Id. at 433. See also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1961)
(discussing disadvantages to allowing district judges, on habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion, to substitute their judgment on issues that should rightfully be adjudi-
cated in state court).
164. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). The Court referenced its earlier attempt to distin-
guish procedural defaults on the basis of whether the attorney had decided to
default on state procedure or whether the petitioner himself had made the con-
scious decision to forego state relief. Id. If the petitioner were a willing partici-
pant in such a default, then the Court would uphold a bar to further relief. Id.
The Court, however, later abandoned this distinction because it placed too great
a burden upon the federal habeus court to determine whether the petitioner
had chosen to default. Id. (citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513-17
(1962); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 162-65 (1957)).
165. Fay, 372 U.S. at 439.
166. Id. at 438.
167. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Francis v. Hen-
derson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
168. 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973).
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and "prejudice" that affected the disposition of his case in or-
der to gain federal review. 169 The Court found that such a
standard avoided an unnecessary retrial by balancing the
state interests against federal concerns protecting constitu-
tional rights.170
In Wainwright v. Sykes, '71 the Court held that the states
could define what constituted a procedural bar.'7 2 The Court
held that the cause-and-prejudice standard afforded greater
respect to state contemporaneous objection rules 173 than did
Fay, while providing an adequate guarantee that federal
claims involving miscarriages of justice will receive review.' 7 4
The cause 175 the petitioner must demonstrate was later de-
fined as an external influence that prevented the petitioner
from meeting his procedural requirements over which neither
the petitioner nor his attorney had control.'
76
169. Id. The Court failed, however, to define the "cause" requirement. In
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), the Court elaborated on the definition
of "cause," explaining that the petitioner must demonstrate that some objective
factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the
State's procedural rule.
170. Davis, 411 U.S. at 241-43. The Court, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1977), asserted that it was necessary to recognize the "legitimate interests
of both State and National governments, and ... [that] the National govern-
ment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and fed-
eral interests, always [endeavors] to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the States." Id. at 44.
171. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
172. Id. at 88.
173. Id. The state contemporaneous objection rule requires that objections
based upon constitutional claims be made at trial, when the witnesses' recollec-
tions are fresh, and allows the trial judge to evaluate the validity of the witness
testimony because the judge alone is able to observe demeanor. Id. The Court
hoped this process would encourage the proper determination of the issues. Id.
However, the Wainwright Court asserted that allowing petitioners to raise fed-
eral issues on appeal that were not raised at trial deliberately encourages attor-
neys to save some of their potential appeals at the risk of conviction in state
court, thereby creating a second chance to save their clients through the federal
habeas process. Id. at 87-90.
174. Id. at 90-91.
175. In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), the Court noted that "cause"
may exist where a factual or legal basis for a claim was not readily available to
counsel, interference by officials made compliance impracticable, or a state de-
prived a defendant of adequate assistance of counsel. See also Reed v. Ross, 468
U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (finding "cause" if a constitutional claim is so novel that its
legal basis is not reasonably available for counsel to raise at trial); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953) (defining "cause" as a detention of a prisoner
without opportunity to appeal because of lack of counsel, incapacity, or some
interference by officials).
176. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
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In Harris v. Reed,17 7 the Court hinted that Fay was su-
perseded, but it did not expressly overrule Fay.'17 The peti-
tioner in Harris raised only a single constitutional challenge
on direct appeal in state court and brought a few additional
claims in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.179 The state
appellate court relied upon a "well settled" Illinois law that
held that claims not raised on direct appeal are considered
waived.18 0 The Harris Court relied upon Wainwright and
subsequent cases to find that adequate and independent
state grounds for a procedural default will bar federal habeas
review unless the petitioner can demonstrate "cause and prej-
udice" or a "miscarriage of justice."181 The Supreme Court
also held that the "plain statement" rule, established in Mich-
igan v. Long, 18 2 applies to a federal habeas corpus petition.18 3
In Engle v. Isaac,18 4 the Court conceded that in "appro-
priate cases" the principles of comity and finality, which pro-
vide the basis for the cause and prejudice test, "must yield to
the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarcer-
ation."8 5 The Court asserted that most victims of a funda-
mental miscarriage of justice will qualify for review under the
cause and prejudice standard. 8 6 The Court, however, al-
lowed the habeas review in the absence of cause for proce-
dural default only in extraordinary cases where a constitu-
tional violation probably resulted in the conviction of an
innocent person.18 7
a. The Coleman Decision: Attorney Error as a
Constitutional Violation
Coleman argued that the attorney's failure to meet the
filing deadline resulting in his default on appeal constituted
177. 489 U.S. 255 (1989).
178. Id. at 262.
179. Id. at 257.
180. Id. at 258.
181. Id.
182. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The Court in Long held that if the state court
decision "fairly appears" to rely primarily upon federal law, the Supreme Court
may review federal questions in the case, unless the state court decision con-
tains a plain statement that its decision relies upon adequate and independent
state grounds. Id. at 1042 n.7.
183. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 (1989).
184. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
185. Id. at 135.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
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"cause" to excuse the procedural default. 88 The Murray
standard for "cause," however, required that the petitioner
demonstrate that some objective factor external to the de-
fense impeded his counsel's efforts to comply with the state's
procedural rules. 18 9 The nature of these reasons differ
greatly from the error that Coleman's attorney made. The at-
torney's actions failed to meet the "cause" standard because
they were not instigated by a force external to the attorney.
The Court in Murray explained that the question of
"cause" does not turn on whether the attorney erred or what
type of error the attorney made. 190 Instead, the Court fo-
cused on the traditional principle that the client bears the
burden for any error his or her attorney makes 19 ' and is
bound by the judgments of his or her attorney.192 The Mur-
ray Court found no inequity in requiring a defendant to for-
feit further appeals due to attorney error. 193
Similarly, Coleman could not successfully argue that his
attorney's error constituted inadequate assistance of counsel
at trial. The error occurred during proceedings following the
first appeal. 194 While a prisoner has the right to assistance of
counsel at the first post-conviction appeal,'9 5 there is no con-
stitutional right to counsel at collateral state proceedings. 196
Consequently, an indigent petitioner must proceed pro se in
any proceedings following the first appeal if he is unable to
pay for an attorney. Additionally, ineffective or incompetent
counsel at post-conviction proceedings does not constitute a
constitutional violation. 197 So, while Coleman's claim did not
satisfy the "cause" requirement under Murray, an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim cannot qualify as a "fundamental
188. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991).
189. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 492.
190. Id. at 488.
191. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)).
192. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
193. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
194. See supra text accompanying note 3.
195. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (affirming former deci-
sion that defendants have right to counsel through first post-conviction pro-
ceeding while granting individual states discretion to implement program).
196. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (denying death row in-
mates counsel at collateral proceedings because constitutional guarantee of
assistance of counsel that protects defendant's presumed innocence is extin-
guished upon conviction).
197. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991).
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miscarriage of justice" because the ineffective assistance
must be a constitutional violation. 198
4. The Coleman Decision and Rationale
In Coleman v. Thompson,199 the Court expressly over-
ruled Fay and held that where a state prisoner defaulted on
his or her federal claims in state court based on adequate and
independent state grounds, federal habeas review is barred
unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the failure to con-
sider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.200 The Court held that the adequate and indepen-
dent state grounds doctrine could be applied to Supreme
Court appellate review of state court judgments, as well as to
deciding whether a federal district court should review the
habeas claims of state prisoners.2° '
The Court asserted the Fay decision was founded upon a
concept of state and federal relations that undervalued the
importance of state procedural rules.20 2 The Coleman Court
recognized both the importance of finality accomplished by
state procedural rules and the "significant harm" to the
states where the federal judiciary fails to respect the sover-
eignty of state courts.20 3
The Court highlighted that the application of the cause-
and-prejudice standard varied depending upon which type of
default occurred.20 4 The Coleman Court found that applying
the cause-and-prejudice standard eliminated the "irrational"
distinction between disparate treatment of Fay and the rest
of the procedural default cases.20 5 Furthermore, the Court
198. Id. See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).
199. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
200. Id. at 2564. In Murray, the Court stated a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice" occurs "where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the
writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default." Mur-
ray, 477 U.S. at 496. The Murray Court applied the cause-and-prejudice stan-
dard to the failure to raise a particular claim on appeal. Id.
201. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2554.
202. Id. at 2565.
203. Id.
204. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991).
205. Id. The court applied the cause-and-prejudice standard to petitions
based upon failure to make timely challenges to state contemporaneous objec-
tion rules. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (challenging competent de-
fense counsel's failure to make a substantive claim of error); Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107 (1982) (challenging jury instructions); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
650 [Vol. 34
HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW
believed that its ruling would eliminate any inconsistencies
between deference given to the state and federal rules.2 °6
The Coleman Court reiterated that federal procedural rules
serve important interests when they bar federal review of
constitutional claims and that the importance should be
equally recognized with regard to state procedural rules.
20 7
III. THE PROBLEM IDENTIFIED
The problem after Coleman is that a petitioner loses all
further state and federal habeas appeals as a result of his or
her attorney's failure to meet a filing deadline.208 The
Supreme Court held that independent state law regarding
procedural defaults is an adequate ground to preclude all fur-
ther state and federal appeals.20 9 Yet, new evidence discov-
ered after the close of a state trial-evidence that an attorney
might have discovered through greater diligence-may cast
considerable doubt upon the petitioner's guilt. Under the
Court's current reasoning, however, federalism collides with
the writ of habeas corpus, and the state's interests trump
"the highest safeguard of liberty,"21 0 thereby sacrificing the
constitutional right of due process.
IV. ANALYsis
This analysis examines the Coleman Court's basis for de-
nying federal habeas review and questions whether the con-
siderations of federalism and comity would be met even if the
Court allowed habeas review for petitioners in Coleman's cir-
cumstances. The procedural model that the Court and Con-
gress established efficiently utilizes state and federal court
time because it demands compliance with procedural laws re-
72 (1977) (challenging admission of inculpatory statements); Francis v. Hen-
derson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (challenging composition of grand jury).
206. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2565.
207. Id. Originally, the Court recognized this principle in Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), and stated: "There is no reason to... give
greater preclusive effect to procedural defaults by federal defendants than to
similar defaults by state defendants." Id. at 228.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 188-207.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 129-132.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 21-31.
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quiring defendants and their lawyers to bring all state and
federal claims in state court.2 11
The result in Coleman, however, is fundamentally unset-
tling. The petitioner never introduced what became the
"newly discovered evidence" in the trial proceedings allegedly
because of his attorney's lack of diligence at trial.212 Peti-
tioner failed to meet the state procedural requirements on ap-
peal because his attorneys filed the papers three days late.213
Potentially exculpatory evidence was never reviewed and
Coleman was never afforded full procedural due process be-
cause the attorneys allegedly failed to vigorously represent
the client at trial and allegedly failed to represent him ade-
quately on a ppeal.21 4
A. Fundamental Principles of Habeas Corpus
The circumstances as they occured in Coleman were ap-
propriate for habeas corpus review. Coleman followed and
exhausted all state and federal appellate review available to
him, which was limited by the Virginia rules regarding proce-
dural default. 21 r Habeas review was the only alternative.
Coleman's case is a situation, as described in Murray v. Car-
rier,21 6 where state procedural rules were followed and state
law applied, but manifest injustice resulted.2 17 Coleman
pleaded his constitutional claims at the trial level and pur-
sued his claims through the Virginia and United States
supreme courts; the evidence, however, came to light after fu-
ture review was barred.21 8
The Coleman case was not a situation where a petitioner
serving many years in prison petitioned the court several
times a month to advance his novel and frivolous legal de-
fenses. Nor was this a situation where the petitioner deliber-
ately withheld federal claims in past proceedings in anticipa-
211. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95, 98, 137-139. This is a much-
needed remedy to the overburdened appellate process, which is crippling the
American justice system. See Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in
Capital Cases, Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) 3239 (1989) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Committee].
212. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 3-8, 11-12.
215. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553 (1991).
216. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
217. Id. at 496.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
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tion of getting a second chance to win his freedom through
the federal court.219 In those cases, denial of habeas review
serves the ends of procedural finality and elimination of un-
necessary and burdensome work for the courts.22 °
Coleman's case was different. Here, possible exculpatory
evidence was not previously reviewed, and state procedure
prohibited any future review. Coleman never received full
procedural due process due to the alleged negligence and in-
adequacy of his state-appointed attorney. The writ of habeas
corpus was designed precisely for circumstances such as
Coleman's, as no other legal alternatives exist and the writ is
the last possible avenue of relief against an unjust convic-
tion.221 The Court has consistently proclaimed that habeas
review is available in situations where the legal procedure
and precedent produce a fundamentally unjust result.222 In
the past, the Court stated that the writ should be utilized to
cut through legal procedure and provide just results.223 Yet,
Coleman was denied the writ due to an administrative error,
and evidence material to his case was never considered.
B. Statutory and Common Law Requirements
Application of the writ in Coleman's circumstances would
have been consistent with the language of Section 2254 of the
habeas corpus statute, as there was no corrective state proce-
dure available.224 The section requires that the petitioner be
in custody pursuant to a state conviction in violation of the
Federal Constitution.2 25 Coleman would have had general
access to the writ had he been able to establish that he was in
custody in violation of the United States Constitution.
226 His
attorney's conduct, however, did not rise to the level of uncon-
stitutional inadequacy of counsel, because a defendant has a
constitutional right to counsel solely through the sentencing
phase, and in capital cases, during the first appeal.
227 The
219. See supra text accompanying note 3.
220. See Henry Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Crim-
inal Judgments, 38 U. CM. L. REv. 142 (1970).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8, 21-31.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
223. See supra text accompanying note 29.
224. See supra note 2-5 and 68.
225. See supra note 65.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15, 71.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 195-196.
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attorney's error occurred during the second appeal228 and
therefore did not provide the basis for a constitutional chal-
lenge. Coleman was also unsuccessful in pleading any other
constitutional violation.229
Coleman's strongest challenge to his conviction, however,
appears to be in the spirit of the Constitution, rather than the
letter of the law. It is difficult to believe that a denial of re-
view of new evidence in Coleman's situation, without even
considering its probative value, is not denial of the constitu-
tional right to due process.23 ° If his attorney had not proce-
durally defaulted and forfeited the right to further appeals,
Coleman would have had access to the habeas process.23'
Thus, he could have included the allegations of new evidence
in the habeas petition. In addition, any petitioner who has
trial and appellate records identical to the records of Cole-
man, but has met his or her filing deadlines and pursued all
available state remedies to completion, would have access to
habeas review.232 Establishing timely filing as the criteria
for review is wholly capricious.
C. Adequate and Independent State Grounds
The Supreme Court held that when a state decision is
based upon adequate and independent state grounds, the fed-
eral court is precluded from adjudicating the federal claim.233
The Court in Coleman found that the Virginia procedural bar
was adequate and independent state grounds, and therefore
barred federal review of the case.234 In light of the new evi-
dence, however, Coleman's case as presented to the federal
court would not be the same case presented to the state
court.23 5 Thus, assuming that the new evidence would be ad-
mitted and therefore result in a habeas corpus hearing, the
Virginia state judgment, which did not take into considera-
228. See supra text accompanying note 3.
229. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553 (1991).
230. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 876-84 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (proposing procedures and standards of review for a petitioner who al-
leges actual innocence, because executing an innocent person violates the Due
Process Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment).
231. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2554-55.
232. Id. Under these circumstances, a petitioner would have exhausted the
available state remedies.
233. See supra text accompanying note 79.
234. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2559, 2560, 2565-66 (1991).




tion potentially exculpatory evidence, arguably cannot rest
on adequate legal grounds because it does not reflect a con-
sideration of the entire body of evidence.
The habeas court may have concluded that the new evi-
dence does not substantiate any federal claim and thereby de-
nied any further investigation into the issues. The evidence
must first be subject to habeas corpus review for the court to
make this determination. Thus, due process is eliminated
whenever the procedural bar is invoked.
Commentator Paul Bator asserted that the federal judici-
ary's use of the writ as a "backstop" to unsatisfactory state
court decisions was politically unwise. 237 He suggested that
the preferred method is a reversal of the state court deci-
sion.2 3 8 Bator's proposal suggests that the direct review and
reversal procedure already exists for the purpose of respond-
ing to inadequate state procedure. 239 Thus, Bator suggests
inappropriate application of the writ in this manner would
undercut the sovereignty of the state to establish its own
procedure.24 °
The weight of the recent common law, however, empha-
sizes deference to state laws and indicates that it would be
unlikely that the federal judiciary would impose such a force-
ful directive upon the states in a situation similar to the one
Coleman faced.24 ' If the Court determined that the state
court findings were based upon adequate state grounds, the
Court would refrain from interfering in the state proce-
dure.242 Requiring the state to restructure its criminal proce-
dure to accommodate the federal judiciary's wishes conflicts
with a state's sovereign powers to establish its own laws.
2 43
It seems unlikely that the Court would interfere with state
procedure in this manner if the federal government had a less
obtrusive alternative for rectifying the petitioner's claim.
2 4 4
Additionally, Coleman was precluded from further state
appeals and therefore could not initiate his claim based upon
236. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
237. See supra text accompanying note 92.
238. See supra text accompanying note 93.
239. Bator, supra note 89, at 492.
240. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 90-100, 115-18.
242. See Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-54.
243. See id. at 2555.
244. See id.
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the new evidence in state court to advance his petition to the
United States Supreme Court for direct review.24 Waiting
for another petitioner's challenge to raise the issue on direct
review does not stay the executioner's hand or delay the time
spent in prison for the first petitioner. Professor Bator's pro-
posal may be appropriate for a petitioner who can still peti-
tion the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, but it is
inadequate for the petitioner who cannot obtain direct review
from the Supreme Court. Coleman's only remaining option
was habeas corpus review in federal court.
D. Exhaustion of State Remedies
Coleman satisfied the exhaustion requirement under
Section 2254 of the United States statute on habeas
corpus. 246 The exhaustion doctrine requires that a petitioner
bring all federal claims in state court and pursue full state
and federal appellate review.247 The Supreme Court held
that because Coleman failed to appeal the state appellate
court's adverse decision, he did not exhaust all possible state
remedies. 248  The exhaustion doctrine, however, was
designed to force defendants to bring their federal claims in
state court and encourage the defendants to seek redress in
the state courts before turning to the federal courts for re-
view.249 Coleman raised all federal claims in state court, pur-
sued his claims through the Virginia state appellate process,
and petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certio-
rari.250 Those petitions included all federal claims applicable
to him at the time of the appeals.
The evidence in question, however, came to light after
the appellate process was completed and the state declared
his case closed to further review.251 His need for federal re-
view was not due to deliberate withholding of federal claims
in the state courts, but rather because the state courts were
closed to him, and a new claim had arisen.252
245. See id. at 2552-53.
246. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 94-99.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
249. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-20 (1962), overruled by Coleman v.
Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
250. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 5, 12 and accompanying text.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
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E. Federal Deference to State Procedure
In Coleman, the Court continuously reiterated the impor-
tance of federal deference to state procedure, recognizing that
substantive and procedural state law are within the sover-
eign domain of the state, and necessary in order for that pub-
lic body to govern itself.25 3 The proposition that the federal
court may release a state prisoner on the basis of a habeas
claim represents the most egregious imposition of state
sovereignty.254
The Coleman Court determined that Fay was based upon
a concept of state and federal relations that undervalued the
importance of state procedural rules.255 The Court noted that
the Virginia procedure was designed to bring finality to cases,
and the federal government significantly harms the state by
failing to respect the state laws.256 Virginia, however, has no
state procedure to regulate a petitioner's post-default claim
based upon new evidence. In fact, Virginia specifically barred
further review in Coleman's case.257 If the federal court is-
sued a writ of habeas corpus, it would not have been acting in
disregard of state procedure. No state corrective procedure
existed to address Coleman's situation, so the federal habeas
writ may have been issued.258
F. Coleman's Challenge Meets the Fay Standard
Coleman clearly qualified for habeas corpus review
under the more lenient Fay standard of deliberate by-pass.259
The Fay rule allowed for habeas corpus review if the proce-
dural default resulted from inadvertence, but barred review if
the default was a deliberate attempt to circumvent state pro-
cedure.26 ° Coleman satisfied these criteria because the requi-
site papers, constituting a notice of appeal, which were at is-
sue in the procedural default, were eventually filed three
253. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at, 2554, 2555, 2564, 2565.
254. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991).
255. Id. at 2565.
256. Id.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
258. Coleman pursued all avenues of relief in state court before petitioning
the federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. See supra text accompanying
notes 2-5.
259. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-40 (1962) overruled by Coleman v.
Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
260. See supra text accompanying note 111.
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days after the deadline passed.26 1 If the attorney were at-
tempting to avoid state adjudication of the issue to preserve
the claim for review in federal court, he never would have
filed the papers. The Fay standard seems to have been
designed to remedy the type of situation that Coleman faced.
The Coleman Court, however, expressly overruled the
application of Fay, endorsing the Wainwright cause-and-prej-
udice standard.262 The Coleman Court attempted to rectify
what it perceived as Fay's lack of deference to state procedure
by demanding that petitioners demonstrate either "cause"
and "prejudice" to their case or a constitutional violation with
fundamentally unfair results.263 The attorney error did not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation because the
Court ruled the petitioner must have a constitutional right to
assistance of counsel in order for inadequacy of counsel to be
considered a constitutional violation.264 Attorney error in ad-
vanced post-conviction appeals cannot satisfy this require-
ment because assistance of counsel is not constitutionally
protected at this stage of the proceedings.265
The new evidence that became available after the close of
state proceedings, however, arguably could have constituted
"cause" as defined in Murray v. Carrier.266 The Court in Mur-
ray stated that a factual or legal basis for a claim that was
not readily available to counsel could constitute "cause."267
Coleman may have argued that the claim could not be made
because the evidence that provided the basis for the claim
was not discovered until after the state closed the case. The
state could argue, and probably successfully, that the evi-
dence was available during the state proceedings, but the at-
torney simply disregarded it. The Courts in Murray and
Reed v. Ross seemed to indicate that the "new factual or legal
basis" exception was designed for claims that did not exist at
the time of the trial, rather than claims which could have
been made but simply were disregarded by the attorney in
the exercise of his or her professional judgment. 268 Tradition-
261. See supra text accompanying note 3.
262. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991).
263. Id. at 2566.
264. Id.
265. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
266. 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
267. See supra note 175.
268. See supra notes 176-77.
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ally, the Court has found that the client bears the burden of
her or his attorney's decisions.26 s
The Court's endorsement of the cause-and-prejudice
standard, however, ignores the fact that inadvertent attorney
error will result in a client losing his or her right to federal
review. The traditional recourse in a situation of attorney
negligence or misconduct is a civil malpractice suit against
the attorney.270 Damages, however, are no remedy when the
client faces prison or the death penalty. Attempting to deter
attorneys from "sandbagging" their defenses by restricting
habeas corpus review misdirects a sanction against a peti-
tioner whose only misdeed was making an administrative er-
ror. Thus, the Court has created a vacuum in the possible
and legitimate remedies by imposing the cause-and-prejudice
standard in all cases of procedural default.
This tension highlights the problem that Coleman faced.
Significant errors occurred in his case, yet they do not rise to
the level of actionable constitutional error under the current
standard. The fundamentally unjust result deserves redress,
but under the current cause-and-prejudice standard, no rem-
edy is available.
V. PROPOSAL
In Coleman v. Thompson,27 ' the Court relied upon state
procedure and the considerations of comity and federalism to
determine that deference to state laws outweighs the oppor-
tunity to further appeals.272 In this case, however, due pro-
cess was sacrificed. This seems an unnecessary cost when
both the state and federal governments are charged with the
responsibility of upholding constitutional rights.
In the rare situation where a petitioner is denied access
to further appeals because his or her attorney erred in post-
conviction proceedings and new evidence is discovered that is
269. See, e.g, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (assigning defend-
ant the burden of risk of attorney error if counsel representation is not constitu-
tionally ineffective); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 113-16 (1977) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (asserting traditional rationale for binding criminal
defendant to actions of attorney founded in agency principles).
270. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 at
185-86 (5th ed. 1984).
271. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991)
272. Id. at 2554-55, 2564-66. See also supra text accompanying notes 97-
100, 114-118.
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sufficient to cast doubt upon the validity of the petitioner's
conviction, the federal writ of habeas corpus should be is-
sued.273 The federal court should evaluate the sufficiency of
the evidence and determine whether the evidence would cast
reasonable doubt upon the validity of the conviction. The fed-
eral habeas court is already empowered to conduct independ-
ent evidentiary inquiries notwithstanding state court
findings.274
This proposition does not require federal inquiry into the
millions of habeas writs that inundate the federal courts
every year.275 Rather, the inquiry would be restricted to the
few cases that resemble the Coleman fact pattern: procedural
defaults, new material evidence, and applications for writs of
habeas corpus. The legitimacy of the current Court's agenda
to restrict the availability of access to the writ is unques-
273. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). In Herrera, the petitioner
argued that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process were vio-
lated by a court's refusal to review new evidence that could allegedly prove his
innocence. Id. at 856. The Supreme Court ruled that if the petitioner could
offer a truly persuasive post-trial demonstration of actual innocence and no
state avenue were open to process such a claim, then federal habeas relief
would be appropriate. Id. The Court, however, characterized that evidentiary
threshold as "extraordinarily high" because granting a writ of habeas corpus at
that point in the proceedings is very disruptive. Id. The Court identified two
issues that weighed against granting such a post-conviction writ: the need for
finality in capital cases and the enormous burden upon the State of retrying a
case based upon stale evidence. Id.
The facts in Coleman are drastically different from those in Herrera. Her-
rera's claims of innocence were based upon the affidavits of a prison inmate and
Herrera's nephew, both claiming that the actual murderer was Herrera's now-
dead brother. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 855. Herrera raised the claim of "actual
innocence" for the first time in his second habeus petition in 1992, ten years
after a jury convicted him of murdering a police officer. In support of the writ
petition, Herrera offered two affadavits of newly discovered evidence-af-
fadavits that were taken eight and ten years after his conviction. Id. at 858. In
Coleman, the claims of innocence were based upon physical evidence that was
not available at time of trial due to the alleged lack of diligence of the trial
counsel. Post-conviction investigation unearthed the evidence, which indicated
that two persons participated in the violent attack. See supra note 12. A former
cellmate of Coleman substantiated the significance of the physical evidence and
implicated another person, who at the time of Coleman's appeals was appar-
ently still alive and available for examination. Id. The validity of Coleman's
claims could have been tested through further investigation and interrogation.
The affiants in Herrera, however, offered no physical evidence and accused a
dead man. Herrera, at 858.
274. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433,478 (1953) (finding the federal district
court has broad power to hold an evidentiary hearing and determine the facts).
275. See Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 211.
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tioned; redundant and frivolous petitions clog the judicial
system every year.2 76 The fundamental rights of a few, how-
ever, should not be sacrificed in order to alleviate the problem
created by many other petitioners whose circumstances are
greatly different than a prisoner in Coleman's situation.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that a state has legitimate interests in
finality and control over state law and proceedings against
federal intrusion. The axiom of "justice delay is justice de-
nied" highlights the problem now facing the American legal
system, as hundreds of frivolous habeas corpus petitions are
filed each year. Sacrificing one person's fundamental rights
for the sake of federalism and efficiency, however, is mani-
festly unjust. Roger Keith Coleman was executed before the
world ever discovered whether he was really guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. Requiring the exhaustion
of state remedies was designed to inject further order into
procedural conduct and respect for state law. The fundamen-
tal principle of all American law, state or federal, is the effec-
tuation of justice. Sacrificing due process in the name of fed-
eralism and comity fails to accomplish this goal.
Rae K Inafuku*
276. See generally Collings, supra note 34.
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